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Abstract: Practices and conducts in professional and even amateur sports can be 
subject to competition laws as soon as commercial activities are involved. From an 
economic perspective, this implies that both directly commercial activities like the 
sale of broadcasting/media rights and indirectly commercial activities like defining 
and enforcing the rules of the games can be hit by competition policy interven-
tions. Setting and enforcing the rules of the game is an activity with commercial 
effects because it influences attractiveness and marketability of the sports in ques-
tion. After discussing fundamental issues, this contributions reviews selected land-
mark cases in sports competition policy from an economic perspective. This in-
cludes the U.S. baseball antitrust exemption, access rules to Judo tournaments, sale 
systems of media rights in European football as well as a unique combination of 
long-run exclusivity contracts, skewed allocation of common revenues, and special 
influences on rule-setting by some competitors in Formula One motor racing. Even-
tually, the areas of state aid to football clubs and mergers in Danish football are 
sketched.   
 
Keywords: sports economics, antitrust, competition policy, baseball, judo, football, 
soccer, motor racing, formula one, media rights, sports broadcasting, competitive 
balance, cartels, abuse of dominance 
 
JEL-Codes: K21, L40, Z20, L83, L82 
  
                                                          
*  Professor of Economic Theory, Institute of Economics, Institute of Media and Mobile Communi-
cation, Ilmenau University of Technology, Germany, email: oliver.budzinski@tu-ilmenau.de. The 
author thanks Annika Stöhr and Milan Lange for valuable editorial assistance. A significantly 
shorter and considerably revised version will be published in the Sage Handbook of Sports Eco-
nomics. 
2 
 
1.  Introduction: Why, When, and How Do Competition Rules Apply to Sports? 
The virtue of competitive markets is the decentralized coordination mechanism, 
driving supply and demand towards each other. All kinds of influences and shocks 
drive individual supply and demand plans away from each other but through mar-
ket competition permanent coordination is inherently provided. As a consequence, 
competitive markets coordinate economic relations and while doing so promote 
efficiency of (i) allocation (static welfare), (ii) innovation (dynamic welfare) as well 
as (iii) reactive capacity (evolutionary welfare). Furthermore, competition is simulta-
neously a precondition and a consequence of the individual freedom to act in eco-
nomic affairs (freedom of consumption choice, freedom of supply). However, com-
petitive markets can only be workable and effective if anticompetitive arrange-
ments and conduct by the market participants undermining competition forces is 
prevented.1 It is the task of competition policy to combat and deter anticompetitive 
arrangements and conduct from within the market. The vast majority of countries 
in the world have implemented competition policy regimes, some more than hun-
dred years ago, some during the last two decades (Budzinski 2008). Virtually all of 
them include three fundamental elements: (i) combating anticompetitive cartels 
and cartel-like arrangements, (ii) controlling monopolists and dominant companies, 
at least combating the abuse of market power, and (iii) limiting market concentra-
tion by controlling mergers and acquisitions for anticompetitive effects. Some addi-
tionally seek to combat (however defined) unfair business practices from non-
market powerful companies or engage in consumer protection regulation. Eventu-
ally, the international competition policy regime of the European Union additionally 
combats anticompetitive state aid for companies competing in the common mar-
ket. 
 
Generally speaking, competition policy addresses all types of commercial activities 
and, thus, all industries and businesses within an economy. Sport is no exception as 
soon as it involves commercial activities. Their existence is obvious from an eco-
                                                          
1  Additionally, there are some institutional preconditions for workable markets like property 
rights definition and enforcement as well as the absence of market external (for instance, gov-
ernmental) torpedoing of competition. 
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nomic perspective if we look into professional sports that often is a billion dollar 
business: for instance, revenues of the American National Football League (NFL) 
and the English Premier League were 13 bn US$ (2015) and 4.838 bn € 
(2014/2015) respectively. The economic impact of sport on the European Union’ 
economy sums up to almost 4 per cent of GDP and more than 5 per cent of the 
labor force. 2 Beyond clear-cut cases, however, it is difficult to exactly delineate 
commercial sports business from non-commercial sporting activities like grassroots 
sports conducted by people in their leisure time. Between these two extremes, a 
large variety of semi-professional and semi-commercial sports exists and it may re-
quire a case-by-case assessment whether they should be subject to competition 
policy or not. For instance, a recent controversy revolved around US college sports, 
which tends to view itself to be an amateur, non-commercial sport, but which cre-
ates considerable monetary turnover – and, thus, was found to be subject to com-
petition rules and policy in several recent court decisions. If any given sports has a 
relevant commercial side, then every activity affecting its commercial performance 
may be subject to competition policy, irrespective whether this activity is directly 
commercial itself (like the sale of media rights) or ‘just’ influences the attractiveness 
of the sport for spectators (like a change in the sporting rules). 
 
However, what about the special characteristics of sports, in particular the need for 
cooperation among the competitors that is of constituting character for sports 
economics as a discipline (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964)? In order to set up a 
championship or league as a marketable product, the competitors in the sport 
market must cooperate on the rules of the game, the schedule, enforcement, etc. 
In economic language this implies that a governance structure with market-internal 
institutions (rules of the game) that are enforced by a market-internal regulator is 
required. The market-internal institutions virtually always affect competition – re-
gardless of whether they are of sporting nature (like the dimensions of a football 
goal or the number of participants and the conditions of their qualification) or 
commercial at heart (like the marketing of the championship brand or the sale of 
media rights). In contrast to most other industries, the market-internal regulators 
                                                          
2  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html (2017-05-29). 
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enjoy comprehensive power: they, inter alia, set and enforce the rules of the game, 
limit and control participation (market entry), market the common product (inter 
alia, bundling and selling broadcasting rights), and organize the sharing, distrib-
uting and re-allocation of revenues. Thus, the market-internal regulator combines 
championship management with government-like regulation. While this would be 
viewed to be blatantly anticompetitive and against fundamental market economy 
principles in virtually every other industry, the existence of the market-internal 
regulators and institutions is essential for the business of professional sports since 
cooperation on rules among the participants is elementary for the common prod-
uct to be produced. Thus, on the one hand, they are constitutive for establishing 
sports market competition and, at the same time, restrict competition. From a 
competition policy perspective, this turns the antitrust evaluation of changes in the 
market-internal institutions or practices by market-internal market regulators into a 
challenging task. 
 
The role of the market-internal regulator is particularly delicate because it usually 
finds itself in a monopoly(-like) position. The majority of professional sports organ-
izes itself in a way that there is one single championship, tournament, or league at 
the top level.3 Such an organization promotes consumer (fan) welfare by offering a 
competition of the best teams, athletes, etc. and allows to identify the very best, 
which is – next to the top sports quality (including athletic prowess) – an important 
motivation for sports consumption.4 At the same time, the monopoly position of 
the sports association creates market power that may be abused at the detriment 
of customers (high prices, reduced quantities) but also participants (player wages, 
market entry, cheerleader compensation, etc.). If the participants directly control 
the market-internal regulator, for instance when the teams of a league form and 
own the sports association, then anticompetitive conduct origins from cartelization 
(i.e. the competitors colluding on parameters of competition). If the participants’ 
control of the market-internal regulator is not existent or so indirect that it is inef-
                                                          
3  A prominent exception would be commercial boxing. 
4  While most sports economists would subscribe to the single entity concept, Ross (1989) em-
phasizes the virtues of a competition among championships in the same sports discipline. 
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fective, then the sports ‘authority’ represents a monopolistic bottleneck with verti-
cal market power (see for more details Budzinski & Szymanski 2015). In any case, 
again, the market power is inevitable and cannot be prevented but, at the same 
time, it may create antitrust problems. Notwithstanding, a general market failure of 
sports markets cannot be identified from an economic perspective and as such no 
sector regulation replacing ‘ordinary’ competition policy is required. 
 
Competition policy is inevitably an endeavor in law and economics. While its goals 
are economic at heart – protecting the competitive process – its codification and 
means are law. Logically, the actual law may fit to or deviate from the underlying 
economics. Therefore, competition policy in sports markets depends on the respec-
tive national (or supra-national in the EU case) law and its enforcement. In other 
words, anticompetitive practices that should fall under the rule of competition law 
from an economics perspective may be exempted in a given jurisdiction or vice ver-
sa. So, while from an economic perspective sports markets are subject to competi-
tion policy, they are still characterized by special features that complicate the com-
petition policy assessment of cases in question and, furthermore, their actual 
treatment depends on the competition law regime of the competent jurisdiction.  
The paper exemplary addresses competition policy issues in sports markets. First, 
section 2 deals with a famous antitrust exemption for professional sports in the 
U.S. Then, section 3 discusses how sports rules, the rule of the game, may be a rel-
evant competition policy issue against the background of a European case. Section 
4 analyzes a common cartel in sports market and section 5 describes a particular 
complex recent case of cartelization and abuse of dominance. Eventually, section 6 
lists some more of the common antitrust cases in sports. Since this chapter is eco-
nomic in nature, it cannot give a comprehensive overview on sports-related compe-
tition law and case law (see for overviews Pelnar 2007; Papaloucas 2008).5 Instead, 
it aims to reveal the economic line of reasoning underlying the selected sports anti-
trust cases and provide a critical discussion of them. 
 
                                                          
5  Budzinski (2012: 66-71) provides a comprehensive list of antitrust and competition policy cases in 
sports markets in the European Union. 
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2.  The Baseball Antitrust Exemption in the U.S. 
Probably, the most famous sports-related antitrust exemption relates to Baseball in 
the U.S. Baltimore Baseball Club of the Federal League brought antitrust action 
against the National League and the American League in 1922, claiming attempted 
monopolization of professional baseball in the U.S. and restrictions of trade, for 
instance, by the implementation of the so-called reserve clause6. However, the Su-
preme Court ruled that US antitrust laws are not applicable to professional baseball 
because it was not viewed to be commercial and because of competitive balance 
considerations, i.e. the anticompetitive structures were deemed to be necessary in 
order to make it a commercial success.7 Since then, professional baseball, most no-
tably Major League Baseball (MLB), enjoys a comprehensive antitrust exemption in 
the U.S. 
 
From an economic perspective, this exemption can hardly be justified. Not only 
does it seem to be inappropriate nowadays to claim a non-commercial character of 
MLB in the face of annual revenues in excess of 8bn US$. Even though these num-
bers had been much lower in the 1920s, the judgment itself reasoned that restric-
tive practices by the leagues were necessary to make the game more attractive and 
the success of the clubs more certain, thus, reverting to commercial reasoning. Fur-
thermore, the strange situation results than one of the U.S. major leagues is ex-
empted from antitrust (baseball), whereas the others are not (football, basketball) 
(Classen 1988: 369). Not surprisingly, many authors argue that several of the cur-
rent arrangements in U.S. baseball are anticompetitive in nature and increase ticket 
and broadcasting prices as well as deter market entries and further cement com-
                                                          
6  The reserve clause assigned far-reaching rights to the clubs regarding players, even after their 
contract had expired. It was part of the instruments allegedly used to protect the major leagues 
against upcoming minor leagues, their clubs or their players (Classen 1988; Brand & Giorgione 
2003). 
7  “If the reserve clause did not exist, the highly skillful players would be absorbed by the more 
wealthy clubs, and thus some clubs in the league would so far outstrip others in playing ability 
that the contests between the superior and inferior clubs would be uninteresting, and the pub-
lic would refuse to patronize them. By means of the reserve clause and provisions in the rules 
and regulations, said one witness, the clubs in the National and American Leagues are more 
evenly balanced, the contests between them are made attractive to the patrons of the game, 
and the success of the clubs more certain.” (National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. 
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc., 269 F. 681, 687; D.C. Cir. 1920; cited after Mehra & 
Zuercher 2006: 1506).  
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petitive advantages of the bigger incumbents, for instance, by blocking MLB teams 
with smaller markets to relocate to bigger and more profitable markets (inter alia, 
Hamilton 1998; Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Mozes & Glicksman 2011). These severe 
restrictive effects are hardly outweighed by claimed benefits like financial contribu-
tions to minor leagues (Grow 2012), which supposedly should be possible with less 
restrictive practices as well. 
 
Competitive balance considerations also represent a difficult justification for the 
MLB antitrust exemption. First, their economic virtue is controversial at best (litera-
ture overview: Pawlowski & Nalbantis 2017). Second, there are several competitive 
balance enhancing regulations that are less restrictive in competition terms. Third, 
instead of granting an overall exemption, the nature of the competitive balance 
problem would be more adequately treated by examining a specific practice by the 
market-internal regulator and weighing its beneficial and restrictive effects. 
 
3.  The Judo Case: Abuse of Market Power? 
Since sports association by their nature as a market internal regulator enjoy a dom-
inant position, their actions may be suspicious regarding an abuse of market pow-
er. While this is obvious if they engage in commercial activities like selling media 
rights (see section 4), it also extends to their core ‘business’: setting and enforcing 
the rules of the games. Even decisions that may appear to be purely sporting at 
first sight may actually include commercial calculus. For instance, the world football 
association FIFA changed the specifications of the football in time for the world 
championship tournament in South Africa (2010). The competition ball was made 
harder so that it would make the job of the goalkeepers more difficult, thus leading 
to more goals, thus making the sport more attractive – and more attractive implies 
economically more successful. Similarly, attempts to make sports more television-
friendly in order to increase demand and revenues from media represents examples 
where ostensibly purely sporting rules are shaped according to commercial consid-
erations. Many recent changes in the combating rules but also in the points system 
of Judo enacted by the International Judo Federation (IJF), for instance, were clearly 
motivated by the desire to enhance the TV-attractiveness of Judo. And it is no 
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stretch to assume that also the enforcement of rules may be subject to commercial 
considerations.  
 
Among the core sporting tasks of sports associations lies the definition of the 
number of participants in premier-level tournaments and the selection criteria. Log-
ically, it is impossible to have open top-level championships in most sports, so 
some limitation – and subsequently the implementation of a selection system – is 
necessary. Notwithstanding, limiting the participants of premier-level champion-
ships represents (i) an artificial reduction of quantity and (ii) the deterrence of a 
number of wannabe-participants from the commercially most attractive tourna-
ments. Both are typical abuse-strategies of market dominators and monopolies. 
Still, they are necessary in sports market to some extend – but, of course, may also 
be abusively exaggerated (Grow 2015: 604-614). 
 
In February 1996, Christelle Deliège, a Belgian Judo fighter in the under 52 kg-class, 
was prevented from participating in the prestigious Paris International Judo Tour-
nament, a tournament where qualification points for the 1996 Atlanta Olympic 
games could be obtained. Obviously, for Deliège such participation would have 
been extremely relevant – not only career-wise but also commercially.8 However, 
her home sports association, the Ligue Belge de Judo (LBJ) nominated two other 
athletes for the Paris tournament. According to rules implemented by the European 
Judo Union (EJU), each national federation was limited to a maximum of two judo-
ka per weight class for such qualification tournaments as the one in Paris. Christelle 
Deliège contested (i) the EJU-quota as being unnecessary restrictive and (ii) the se-
lection decision of the LBJ as being based on non-objective, intransparent criteria. 
The involved sports associations, in contrast, disputed the economic relevance of 
their selection decisions (because according to their definition Judo was an ama-
teur sport) and insisted on their autonomy in such decisions.   
                                                          
8  Up to this point, Christelle Deliège had won several times the Belgian championships in her 
class as well as once the European championship and the under-19 world championship. Thus, 
she clearly does not represent some random judoka wanting to fight beyond her sporting 
scope.  
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However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)9 ruled that sporting rules including 
participation and qualification rules fall under the jurisdiction of business and com-
petition law and “the mere fact that a sports association or federation unilaterally 
classifies its members as amateur athletes does not in itself mean that those mem-
bers do not engage in economic activities within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Treaty” (ECJ 2000, para 46). The ECJ gave the opinion that premier-level sport usu-
ally involves economic activities (sponsorships, advertising revenues, media reve-
nues, ticket sales, grants for athletes, etc.). However, it also ruled that selection sys-
tems for premier-level competitions are not per se a violation of law as long as they 
are inherent to the organization of sport (ECJ 2000, para 69). However, a specific 
shape of a selection system may still be unnecessary restrictive. Furthermore, quali-
fication tournaments for the Olympic Games are not events between national 
teams (ECJ 2000, para 44), so that a selection based upon nationality quotas is not 
self-evident. 
 
From an economic perspective, the Deliège case (which enjoys an important role as 
a precedent in law; Bell & Turner-Kerr 2002) is not only interesting because of its 
clarification that high-level sports usually involve economic activities. Instead, the 
questions brought up by the national court about the selection system applied in 
Judo are sports economic at heart: how to evaluate the trade-off between the sof-
tening and biasing effect on competition – here from artificial quantity reduction 
and access deterrence – and the specific requirements and characteristics of sports 
– here the necessity to limit participation in premier-level Judo tournaments? From 
an economics perspective, this trade-off requires that access rules and selection 
systems must be designed so that they minimize the (inevitable) competition-
lessening effects as much as possible. When sports associations define participa-
tion, selection and qualification systems and criteria, they (inevitably) enjoy mo-
nopoly power. Thus, they must be careful not to abuse this power. This can best be 
safeguarded by objective and transparent qualification, selection, as well as promo-
tion and relegation (regarding leagues) criteria. For instance, participation in prem-
                                                          
9  The case was referred to the ECJ by a national court (the Tribunal de Première Instance de 
Namur, Belgium) for obtaining an opinion.  
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ier-level competitions could be open to anyone satisfying objective requirements in 
terms of sporting skills. Alternatively, if too many athletes/teams would meet this 
criterion, a selection based on objective and transparent performance criteria 
would be acceptable as well. However, scope for associations to select ath-
letes/teams based upon non-objective or intransparent, arbitrary or discretionary 
criteria represents an anticompetitive abuse of power from an economic perspec-
tive. Moreover, the total number of participants must not be unnecessary restric-
tive, i.e. there must be reasons inherent to the nature of the respective sports for 
any given limitation of athletes or teams allowed to participate.  
 
Obviously, closed leagues represent an issue according to this line of reasoning as 
they deter outside teams from participating in a commercially lucrative league on 
non-performance-related grounds. For instance, even a better performing, better 
managed, more fan-attractive team cannot enter the closed league on merit of its 
performance.10 More difficult to evaluate is whether top-level sports leagues really 
allow as much teams to compete as it would be inherent to the sports in question. 
Do U.S. major leagues really exploit the maximum participant numbers (skeptical: 
Grow 2015: 604-614)? Are 18 teams (like in the German Bundesliga) for a Europe-
an-style football league a necessary limitation or unnecessary restrictive? What 
about 20 teams like in the Spanish La Liga or in the English Premier League? Similar 
reasoning applies to tournaments where individual athletes compete with each 
other. And what about national quotas for competitions that are not matches be-
tween national teams? For instance, two of the top three Judoka in the IJF World 
Ranking List in the class of men under-100 kg before the 2016 Rio de Janeiro 
Olympic Games were German. However, due to the selection rules of the Olympic 
Committee (allowing only one judoka per class per country per sex to compete, 
                                                          
10  Very recently, two lower-tie US soccer clubs (Miami FC of the North American Soccer League) 
and Kingston Stockade FC of National Premier Soccer League) brought a case against the U.S. 
Soccer Federation because the absence of a promotion and relegation system deters them from 
having the sporting and commercial option to enter higher league levels on sporting perfor-
mance grounds. (At present, the only way to gain entry to Major League Soccer, North Ameri-
ca's top league, is by paying about $150 million and being selected by an expansion committee 
as a viable location for a new team.) Thus, they are excluded from competing in the commer-
cially most relevant soccer markets in the U.S. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-usa-
cas-idUSKBN1AJ2YL; 2017-08-17). 
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given that she/he matches some minimum performance requirements), one of 
them was deterred from competing in Rio, whereas many lower-ranked judoka 
from other nationalities qualified since they were the best of their countries – de-
spite lower-level performances. According to news reports, there is an even more 
bizarre case from the Paralympics nomination for Rio 2016 in archery (compound 
class). Despite being ahead in respect to sporting criteria, including the world rank-
ing list, Vanessa Bui was not nominated because – as the national head coach ap-
parently reasoned – her performance level was slightly dropping during recent 
tournament finals. The competent association has not defined clear-cut and trans-
parent selection criteria, thus, such more subjective reasoning and assessments de-
cided. The athlete that replaced her in the nominations, coincidentally, was the 
wife of the team manager.11 Do such selection systems and decisions display anti-
competitive effects or are they necessary and inherent to the sport in question? 
Unfortunately, the sports economics literature remains very silent on such ques-
tions so far. 
 
Following up on the Deliège and other court rulings12, the European Commission 
developed a procedure that sporting rules and conduct by sports associations may 
not be restrictive in economic terms unless they (i) pursue a legitimate objective, (ii) 
its restrictive effects are inherent to the pursuit of that objective, and (iii) propor-
tionate to it (European Commission 2007a, 2007b; Budzinski 2012: 48-51). If these 
conditions are not met, the rule, arrangement or conduct in question is deemed to 
be anticompetitive and thus prohibited by competition policy. However, if an ob-
jective justification exists, i.e. if beneficial effects of the rule or conduct in question 
outweigh the anticompetitive effects, an exemption from prohibition is possible. 
Such an exemption usually requires an in-depth analysis and evidence that con-
                                                          
11  Inter alia, https://www.merkur.de/lokales/fuerstenfeldbruck/skandal-paralympics-olympia-
bogenschiessen-vanessa-6640925.html or 
http://www.br.de/themen/sport/inhalt/olympia/paralympics-vanessa-bui-interview-100.html 
(2017-08-17; 16:04). 
12  In 2007, the ECJ confirmed and extended his line of reasoning in the Meca-Medina-case, involv-
ing prohibitions to participate because of doping suspicions. It clarified that every area of 
sports association activity may be subject to competition law according to EU law (Weatherill 
2006). Budzinski (2012: 53-55) provides a list of sporting rules that have been evaluated by Eu-
ropean competition authorities. 
12 
 
sumers (fans) enjoy a net benefit from it. Other jurisdictions typically rely upon 
case-by-case analyses without such detailed guidelines. From an economic perspec-
tive, the three conditions (legitimate objective, inherence of restrictive effects, pro-
portionality) of the European Commission fit well to economic reasoning of trans-
parency and of limiting restrictive effects to the necessary minimum (inherence, 
proportionality), even though the criterion of proportionality may be a bit vague 
and as minimal as possible would be a preferable concept. It can be questioned, 
however, whether an additional case-by-case exemption option is really necessary 
or merely creates scope for anticompetitive lobbyism.13 
 
4.  Centralized Sale of Broadcasting Rights: A Hardcore-Cartel against Media 
 and the Fans? 
Sports associations more often than not do not restrict their activities to what is 
necessary to organize the sport in question. Instead, they often directly engage in 
commercial activities with the sale of media rights (TV broadcasting, online broad-
casting, etc.) in professional ball-game leagues representing a particularly exempla-
ry case. Principally, two different models exist: either every club in the league sells 
the broadcasting rights individually or all the participants (often plus the compe-
tent sports association) sell the rights collectively. Currently, virtually all major pro-
fessional leagues practice a collective sale of media rights. Until the season 
2016/17, the premier-level Spanish European-football league represented a promi-
nent exemption where broadcasting rights were sold individually by the teams. 
 
From the viewpoint of the league and the participating teams, a collective sale is 
attractive because it creates a monopoly-like situation and consequently results in 
higher total media revenues (monopoly rent) compared to a situation where the 
teams compete with each other for broadcasting deals. However, the collective 
deal may not maximize revenues for each single team: maybe, the most attractive 
teams could secure even more profitable deals on their own in contrast to less at-
                                                          
13 For instance, UEFA’s so-called Financial Fair Play regulations were exempted simply by a com-
mon note from that-time UEFA president Platini and that-time EC-commissioner Almunia despi-
te economic analysis showing that the conditions of inherence and proportionality were hardly 
met (Budzinski 2014). 
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tractive teams. The distributional effect on the teams of the league also depends on 
how the common revenue is allocated among the teams (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 
2017: 4-6): 
- equal allocation, i.e. each team receives the same share of the collective rev-
enue, 
- performance-based allocation, i.e. teams receive different shares according 
to their performance; either better performance implies higher shares or, in a 
reverse-performance-based system, better performance implies lower shares, 
and 
- brand value-based allocation, i.e. teams with larger fan-base or higher mar-
keting potential (past success, tradition, etc.) receive higher shares. 
 
The non-equal allocations can encompass different degrees of skewness and ele-
ments of different types of allocation can be combined. While a brand-value alloca-
tion, in tendency, mimics the distributional effects of individual sale systems, the 
other systems benefit some teams (for instance, less successful teams in systems of 
equal or reverse-performance-based allocation) at the expense of others (more suc-
cessful teams). Despite the distributional effects and consequent continuous inter-
nal conflicts about the ‘right’ allocation scheme, the monopoly rent appears to be 
so attractive that virtually all major professional leagues converted to collective sale 
systems of media rights in the course of time. 
 
From a competition economics perspective, a collective sale of media rights repre-
sents a hardcore cartel where the competitors of a market collude to extract rents 
from the other market side by increasing prices and limiting output. Usually, the 
cartelists auction the bundled broadcasting rights (often in one or few exclusive 
packages) like a monopolist with media companies on the other market side com-
petitively bidding for the rights (Cowie & Williams 1997). Premier sports represent 
important content for media companies, considerably influencing their competi-
tiveness (Toft 2006: 3), so their demand is usually relatively price-inelastic. Their 
desire to ‘win’ the auction for exclusivity deals with the most attractive sports 
leagues leads to a dynamic bidding competition, driving up prices. Often, the cartel 
14 
 
also reduces the number or extent of available rights in order to further increase 
prices. Bundling broadcasting rights into one monopolistic package may lead to 
market foreclosure in media markets if only few sports leagues represent premier 
content. While in the US several major leagues compete with each other for fan 
attractiveness, in Europe, for instance, European-style football dominates the mar-
ket. Furthermore, the cartel arrangement can hamper the development of certain 
sub-markets (e.g. new media markets or other regional markets in order to protect 
pay-TV revenues). If media companies have to pay a supracompetitive prices for 
sports broadcasting rights, consumers are indirectly harmed as well. Either media 
companies need to increase their prices in turn (directly in the case of paid content 
like Pay-TV or tax-/fee-based content like Public-TV, indirectly in the case of adver-
tised-financed free content where users/viewers will have to endure more advertis-
ing14) or they can spent less money on other sports and non-sports programs. In  
any case, considerable harm to consumer welfare must be expected. 
The welfare effects of collective (or centralized) sale systems of sports media rights 
have been extensively analyzed in the sports economic literature (Atkinson et al. 
1988; Késenne 2000; 2001; 2009; 2014; Falconieri et al. 2004; Palasca 2006; 
Gürtler 2007; Noll 2007; Peeters 2011; 2012). While there is notable tendency to 
derive or conclude negative total effects on welfare, some benefits for consumer 
(fan) welfare are discussed as well: 
- competitive balance defense, 
- the creation of a single point of sale provides efficiencies by reducing trans-
action costs for clubs and media companies, 
- the creation of a common brand provides efficiencies as it increases recogni-
tion and distribution of the product, and enhances its attractiveness for the 
fans (consumers). 
 
Despite widespread skepticism from the sports economic literature, competition 
authorities and courts have frequently followed these rationales to grant antitrust 
exemptions to collective sale systems in sports. 
                                                          
14  On the economics of advertised-financed contents (platform economics) see, inter alia, Ander-
son & Gabszwewicz (2006) and Budzinski & Satzer (2011). 
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In the U.S., the “competitive balance argument is the main pro-competitive justifi-
cation that sports leagues offer to defend agreements otherwise prohibited by anti-
trust laws” (Mehra & Zuercher 2006: 1505). This goes back to the famous antitrust 
exemption for professional baseball (see section 2.1). Since then the competitive 
balance defense has been brought forward in more than 40 cases in order to justify 
various restrictions of competition such as cartelization among incumbent league 
participants to prevent market entry of new investors, granting of regional monop-
oly privileges (exclusive territories), restricting entry and transfer of players, defini-
tion of terms of player employment and (maximum) salaries, or limitations of (live) 
broadcasting and other media coverage (with detailed case references Mehra & 
Zuercher 2006: 1506-1508). Even though courts do not always uphold the compet-
itive balance defense in any single case, they fundamentally “acknowledge that 
some otherwise anticompetitive restraints may be necessary to encourage competi-
tive balance among the league’s teams“ (Grow 2015: 590; see also ibid: 589-596; 
Ross 2003: 576; Mehra & Zuercher 2006: 1507-1511, 1514). 
 
Interestingly, the important role of the competitive balance defense in antitrust pol-
icy contrasts with an increasing skepticism in sports economic literature about its 
welfare-promoting effects. Even though, competitive balance was originally viewed 
to be an important driver of audience demand15, the empirical literature struggles 
to find a significant positive effect of more competitive balance on audience de-
mand, both in terms of attendance and TV-viewership.16 Furthermore, recent de-
velopment in sports economics theory also cast doubt on an universal relationship 
and either point to other relevant factors or a more differentiated view (inter alia, 
Coates et al. 2014; Humphreys & Zhou 2015; Budzinski & Pawlowski 2017; Paw-
lowski et al. 2017). Therefore, an unconditioned and widespread use of the com-
petitive balance defense to exempt commercial sports from competition law cannot 
be supported by the state of economics research. And even if competitive balance 
was accepted as a defense, then it would only be eligible for arrangements that 
internally allocate the common revenues equally or according to a reverse-
                                                          
15  See generally on demand for sports the overview by Budzinski & Feddersen (2016). 
16  See for a comprehensive literature review Pawlowski & Nalbantis (2017). 
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performance system. Performance-based or brand value systems are much more 
unlikely to create considerable pro-competitive-balance effects. Surprisingly, how-
ever, competition authorities who accepted the competitive-balance-defense have 
usually shied away from setting conditions on the internal allocation mechanism of 
the collectively earned revenues. 
 
Also in the EU, involved parties have brought forward the competitive balance de-
fense in many competition policy cases on community level (case overview: 
Budzinski 2012: 66-71). The European Commission and the European courts 
acknowledged competitive balance justifications in various instances (Ross 2003: 
578-580). The Commission’s 2007 White Paper and accompanying documents ex-
plicitly list the need to preserve competitive balance as a specificity of sports and, 
thus, a legitimate goal of (restrictive) interventions by sports associations (European 
Commission 2007a,b; Weatherill 2012). However, the restrictive effects of the in-
tervention must be inherent to pursuing the legitimate objective (preserving or en-
hancing competitive balance) and proportionate (Budzinski 2012: 49-50). Thus, 
whether an anticompetitive arrangement or practice by a sports association can be 
justified by competitive balance considerations is assessed case-by-case. For in-
stance, it was accepted, inter alia, with respect to the implementation of transfer 
windows or the promotion of home-grown talent (Weatherill 2012) but it was re-
jected in the majority of cases dealing with joint-selling arrangements of broadcast-
ing rights (European Commission 2003: 164-167). 
 
The single-point-of-sale efficiency defense (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 11-12) rests on 
transaction cost reasoning, i.e. having a single point of sale (the cartel) reduces the 
transaction costs for the buyers (media companies). However, without further qual-
ifications this does not qualify from a competition economics point of view: having 
a monopoly supplier indeed always reduces transaction costs in the sense that 
costs of searching and selecting disappear. Still, it reduces welfare because the al-
locative and dynamic inefficiencies of monopoly (or cartelized supply in general) 
easily overcompensate the transaction cost decrease. So, there must be some spe-
cific aspects of selling a league’s or championship’s broadcasting rights (European 
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Commission 2003: rec. 139-153). The European Commission (2007b: 83) argues in 
its UEFA Champions League (European football) decision: “[t]he single point of sale 
enabled the acquisition of coverage for the whole UEFA Champions League season, 
allowing programming to be planned in advance. (…) [D]ue to the knock-out na-
ture of the UEFA Champions League (…) a broadcaster could not know in advance 
which clubs would make it through to the end.” This reasoning emphasizes the 
knock-out character (cup system) of the UEFA Champions League (European Com-
mission 2003: rec. 145). And, indeed, it is difficult to sell the coverage of a whole 
cup in advance with a decentralized system since nobody knows in advance who 
will survive the knock-out rounds. However, from an economics perspective, it is 
not clear at all why the complete coverage must be sold in advance of the season – 
and cannot be offered in sequences corresponding to the knock-out rounds 
(Budzinski 2012: 59-60). Actually, selling broadcasting rights sequentially round-by-
round at a time, when the respective team pairings are actually known, should lead 
to a more efficient price of the media rights. 
 
Moreover, the specific reasoning only covers cup systems. However, the European 
Commission also granted conditional exemption from the cartel prohibition to cen-
tralized broadcasting selling systems of the English Premier League and the German 
Bundesliga (European Commission 2005, 2006) – in both cases with reference to 
the reasoning of the earlier Champions League decision. Both leagues work with a 
playing schedule that is fully determined in advance of the season. So, here the 
single-point-of-sale-defense – which is questionable from an economics perspective 
anyway – does not apply at all. 
 
Another line of reasoning refers to the efficiency effects of creating a common 
brand (increasing recognition and distribution of the product). The creation of a 
coherent league product may increase its attractiveness for the fans (consumers) as 
the product is focused on the competition as a whole rather than the individual 
clubs participating in the competition (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 11-12). Notwith-
standing, a joint-selling arrangement would need to be inherent to create a com-
mon brand (insofar as this represents a legitimate objective). It is difficult, however, 
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to understand why centralized sales systems would be inherent to a common 
brand, i.e., a common appearance could not be safeguarded otherwise (common 
design, lower-level contractual obligations to follow certain standards for broad-
casting, etc.) in an individualized system, except maybe of the broadcasting of 
comprehensive highlights programs of match-days (European Commission 2003, 
rec. 146) – if this is viewed to be an essential service.  
 
Despite the acceptance of the single-point-of-sale defense as well as the common-
brand defense, the European Commission (2007b: 84-89) has established a list of 
remedies that must be fulfilled in order to exempt joint-selling arrangements from 
the cartel prohibition:  
- non-discriminatory and transparent competitive tendering, 
- limitation of the duration of exclusive vertical contracts (max. three seasons), 
i.e. employing a ‘sun-setting mechanism’, 
- limitation of the scope of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. unbundling media 
rights into several separate and meaningful packages in order to prevent 
market foreclosure, 
- exclusion of conditional bidding, 
- fall-back option, use obligation and parallel exploitation in order to remedy 
output restrictions; i.e. unused rights fall back to the individual clubs for 
parallel, competitive exploitation, 
- ‘no single buyer obligation’ in case of already existing dominance of one tel-
evision operator, and 
- trustee supervision of the tender procedure. 
 
These conditions seek to remedy foreclosure effects on downstream media mar-
kets. As such they are certainly quite effective. However, whether they are sufficient 
to safeguard positive consumer welfare effects is doubtful. 
 
5.  The Formula One Case: Abuse of Market Power Combined with a Cartel? 
In the preceding paragraph, I emphasized the importance of the internal allocation 
of common revenues from a collective sale of media rights among the participants, 
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i.e. the teams, the sports association (internal market regulator), and in some cases 
an independent promoter. Such a constellation drives one of the most interesting 
recent competition policy issues in commercial sports – in this case, the FIA Formula 
One World Championship.17 There is a unique element in the governance structure 
of Formula One: the market-internal regulator, the Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile (FIA), sold the exclusive media and marketing rights to Formula One 
for a 100-year period (!) for a one-off lump sum price of US$ 313.7 million (Sylt 
2014a, b) to a company, Formula One Management (FOM)/Delta Topco, that is in-
dependent from both the participating teams and the FIA (until the latter took a 1 
per cent minority share in 2014). While the long period is suspicious in itself from a 
competition economics point of view, it also rather unusual that the participating 
teams in the sport do not hold any shares in the exclusive promoter. Instead, the 
commercial rights holder, through a chain of channel island companies, was origi-
nally majority-owned by Bernie Ecclestone (a former team boss and long-time ally 
of that-time FIA president Max Mosley), then by private equity company CVC Capi-
tal Partners and since 2016/17 by Liberty Media, with several banks as well as in-
vestment and asset management companies as minority shareholders. In most oth-
er commercial sports, the media and marketing rights are in the majority-
ownership of the participants and/or the governing sports association. Eventually, 
the one-off (!) lump sump price of little more than US$ 300 million surprises given 
an annual (!) profit for the owners of more than US$ 500 million in average. So, 
each year nets significant more profit (= after the teams have been paid their 
share) into the pockets of the owners than they paid in total for the 100-year con-
tract. This does smell like a supracompetitive rent. 
 
Given the obvious market power generated by 100 years (2010-2110) exclusive 
media and marketing rights to the worldwide premier motor racing series, the first 
question relates to a possible abuse of market power vis-à-vis the Formula One 
teams. While other commercial/professional sports distribute between 90 and 100 
per cent of collective media revenues to the participating teams (or other partici-
                                                          
17  For more details on the overall case and its economic analysis see Budzinski & Müller-Kock 
(2017). 
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pants), FOM and its owners distributed only 50 to 65 per cent – and pocketed the 
rest as profits for themselves. In the absence of any economically reasonable pro-
competitive explanation of the unique high shares to sports-outsider shareholders, 
an abuse of market power appears to be plausible (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017: 
6-9). 
 
However, there is more to this story when looking at the allocation of media reve-
nues among the teams of Formula One. The part of the common revenues that is 
distributed to the teams is allocated among them according to (i) a performance-
based mechanism and (ii) a so-called heritage payment system. The performance-
based pillar is organized according to the former-seasons standings of the FIA For-
mula One World Constructor Championship (WCC), where the teams are ranked 
according to the points they scored in the races of the season. Here, two aspects 
stand out. First, the allocation is significantly more top-heavy than in other premier 
level professional sports, i.e. the top-performing (low-performing) teams receive a 
comparatively higher (lower) share of the distributed money than in other sports 
(Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017: 13-14). Second, teams outside the top 10 and new-
comer teams reportedly do not receive any share at all. Consequently, the system 
considerably benefits the top teams at the expense of the smaller teams and tends 
to cement existing competitive advantages and disadvantages, thus lessening com-
petition. This is further fuelled by the heritage payments pillar. These payments go 
to five teams (2014-2015) because of their special value for Formula One due to 
historical success (which makes it a special form of a brand value-based system). It 
is puzzling, however, that the ranking of the payments as well as the selection of 
the teams does not correspond at all to historical success figures (Budzinski & Mül-
ler-Kock 2017: 15-16). Furthermore, the heritage payment to Ferrari alone was 
higher than what the WCC-winner received performance-based only. In other 
words, any non-heritage team could win the WCC and yet would receive less mon-
ey than Ferrari, even if Ferrari would end up dead-last.  
 
In 2015, this constellation led to an antitrust complaint by two midfield (and non-
heritage) teams to the European Commission alleging a cartel among FOM and the 
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heritage teams to secure supracompetitive rents and disadvantage non-heritage 
teams, thus restricting competition. As strange as this may sound at first sight – a 
promoter cartelizing with selected teams – the special governance structure of 
Formula One and the actions by the parties stand in line with incentives to form 
such a cartel (Budzinski & Müller-Kock 2017: 9-17). The monopoly power and rents 
for FOM rest on the top teams staying in Formula One and refrain from departing 
to a breakaway series. Thus, there may be countervailing power for the top teams if 
they unionize – but none for midfield teams. Theoretically, a cartel (i) securing 
FOM’s rents and (ii) cementing the competitive advantage of the heritage teams18 
perfectly serves the (anticompetitive) interests of both parties. Moreover, the so-
called Steering Group of Formula One could serve as a stabilizing institutional ar-
rangement. It consists of FIA (6 votes), FOM (6 votes), the five heritage teams (one 
vote each) and one of the non-heritage teams (one vote) and plays the role of a 
gate-keeper regarding rule-changes in Formula One (Sylt 2014b; Rencken 2015). 
Consequently, the alleged cartel teams are privileged in the revenue allocation and 
privileged regarding their influence on rules. Thus, the construction of the Steering 
Group may help to stabilize the cartel by providing a sanction mechanism devaluat-
ing deviation strategies for heritage teams.19  
 
The existence of a cartel would explain the persistence of the unique high share of 
the independent promoter as well as the extraordinary top-heavy character of the 
performance-based allocation pillar and the difficult-to-explain heritage payment 
pillar. Interestingly, the two top receivers of the so-called heritage payments have – 
according to reports – been the first to leave a breakaway series threat (mounted 
by a teams’ union) and to sign with FOM again (Rencken & Barretto 2015; Rencken 
2015). Surprisingly, and despite a request of the European Parliament (2017), the 
European Commission has hitherto not shown any motivation to enter an in-depth 
investigation into this case. 
                                                          
18  Motor racing is a very technology-focused sport where budget differences matter a lot in terms 
of competitiveness. 
19 If one of them would consider leaving the cartel, rule-changes hurting its competitive position 
may be enacted by the cartel insiders through the Steering Group (where cartel outsiders and 
one deviator cannot have a majority of votes). 
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6.  Additional Types of Anticompetitive Practices 
The preceding chapter discussed cartelization and abuse of dominance because 
most competition policy cases in sports fall into these categories. This also includes 
rules and practices that are designed to enhance competition, like (ticket) revenue-
sharing arrangements (e.g. NFL, MLB), salary and payroll caps (e.g. NFL, NBA, NHL), 
direct or indirect budget caps (e.g. UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations), etc., which 
may under specific conditions in effect distort competition and serve to protect su-
pracompetitive rents (Budzinski 2017). Another frequently occurring concern are 
exclusivity contracts with equipment suppliers or definitions of equipment stand-
ards with foreclosure effects (Lopatka 2009). Merger cases, in contrast, are rather 
rare. There have been a few mergers between rivaling leagues, for instance, the 
mergers between the National Football League and the American Football League 
or between the National Basketball Association and the American Basketball Asso-
ciation in the U.S. (Pelnar 2007). However, despite potentially forming a monopoly, 
they usually do not trigger antitrust intervention because consumer welfare bene-
fits from having the best competing in the same championship outweigh monopo-
lization concerns, especially given the peculiar organization structure and coopera-
tion requirement of sports (see section 1). Within leagues, mergers between for-
merly horizontal competitors do raise concerns about a lessening of competition 
from an economic perspective. Usually, they go hand-in-hand with the disappear-
ance of a direct horizontal competitor because owners are normally not allowed to 
run several teams in the same league/championship due to concerns for sporting 
integrity. For instance, the Danish premier level European football league experi-
enced a series of mergers since the 1990s (see table 1) that did not receive much 
attention in the sports economics literature.  
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Table 1: Mergers in Premier-Level Danish Football since 1991 
Year Merging Clubs New Entity 
1991 Farum IK, Stavnsholt BK FC Nordsjælland (until 
2003:  Farum BK) 
1992 Københavns BK, Boldklubben 1903 FC København 
1994 Horsens FS, Dagnæs IF, B1940 AC Horsens 
1999 Ikast FS, Herning Fremad FC Midtjylland 
2005 Helsingør IF, Helsingør FC, Frem Hellebæk IF, 
Vapnagaard FK72, Snekkersten IF 
FC Helsingør (until 2012: 
Elite 3000 FB) 
2006 B 1909, B1913, Dalum IF FC Fyn 
2008 BK Fremad Amager, Dragør BK, Kastrup BK, 
Kløvermarken FB 
FC Amager 
2009 Herfølge BK, Køge BK  
 
HB Køge 
2011  Vejle BK, Kolding FC Vejle Boldklub Kolding 
 
One merger particularly stands out: the merger between Københavns BK (fifteen-
time Danish champion) and its local arch rival BK 1903 (seven-time Danish champi-
on) created the FC København (Copenhagen FC) who went on to win the Danish 
Superligaen (the premier-level Danish football league since 1991) immediately in 
1992-93 and added eleven more titles since then. Thus, two already market-leading 
clubs formed a new entity that is basically dominating Danish professional football 
in the last decade. Some of the other merged entities enjoyed considerably more 
success than their predecessors. For instance, FC Midtjylland became a frontrunner, 
winning the championship in 2014-15, whereas the pre-merger clubs had never 
played a significant role in Danish football. FC Nordsjælland represents a similar 
example, winning the title in 2011-12. In the last twelve years, only one non-
merged club, Aalborg BK, managed to win Superligaen. On the other hand, FC 
Amager (2008) and FC Fyn (2013) went into insolvency and the merger Vejle and 
Kolding was dissolved after only two seasons in June 2013. The case of Danish 
football could be an interesting case study for the effects of mergers in sports 
leagues and would warrant a systematic analysis. 
 
In the European Union, the combat of anticompetitive state aid represents a fourth 
and rather unique pillar of competition policy. This has triggered quite a number of 
cases where national, regional or local governments have subsidized “their” teams 
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with taxpayer money by paying direct grants, financing the arena/stadium or other 
infrastructure, obliterating debts, abating taxes or granting special tax reliefs, pre-
venting insolvencies, granting payments ostensibly for youth/social work, re-
directing state-regulated betting and lottery revenues, etc. (Maria 2007: 291-
312).20 In doing so, they give “their” team a competitive advantage and distort 
competition. A particular prominent case relates to the top European football club 
Real Madrid (Gröteke 2004). It signed an agreement with the Mayor of Madrid and 
the governor of Madrid-region under which the respective administrations changed 
the classification for planning purposes of land owned by Real Madrid from recrea-
tional and parking use to business and commercial use. In doing so, the value of 
the land sky-rocketed and poured significantly more money into the pockets of Real 
Madrid – along with a non-negligible competitive advantage (and instant transfer 
activities to acquire new star players). 
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